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Abstract. We introduce social capital in an endogenous growth model with physical 
capital, human capital, and research and development (R&D), and we compare the mar-
ket with the efficient solutions. As social capital is not tradable in the market and since 
it favours research networks, it introduces new externalities in this framework. These 
externalities induce the market to invest less in social capital than would a social planner 
and decrease the tendency to underinvestment in R&D. We quantify the distortions in the 
model. In some conditions, the new distortions are strong enough to overcome the usual 
result of underinvestment in R&D.
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1. Introduction
In this work we study the interaction effects between social capital and R&D. This is an 
important topic to approach since social capital, in the form of social networks, can help 
knowledge sharing between researchers who work in close proximity to each other, in 
an informal way, through “cheap talk” at lunch, etc. The presence of social capital can 
introduce distortions in market allocations due mainly to two of its features: the failure of 
a market for social capital and the impact it can have on R&D due to research networks. 
The first reason is justified, as firms do not pay for social capital when they contract 
workers; they pay for hours of work and, at most, for the level of qualifications. This 
may be because the features usually included in social capital (confidence, truth, infor-
mal networks) are more difficult to evaluate and monitor than academic degrees or years 
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of schooling. The second reason is based on the importance of social networks between 
researchers in R&D productivity. An example often given is the importance of networks 
of researchers in Silicon Valley. Another is the proximity of research staff in universities. 
The notion of clusters and the creation of a knowledge based economy in the European 
Union, goals of the Lisbon Agenda, are also based on the idea of networks, as discussed 
in Melnikas (2005).
Social capital is a sociological concept that has been introduced recently in the eco-
nomic growth literature. The definition of Putnam (1993) refers to this concept as “fea-
tures of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”. Most of the empirical literature 
has found a positive influence of social capital on economic growth, although it varies 
considerably (examples include Knack, Keefer (1997); Temple and Johnson (1998); 
Whiteley (2000), and Rupasingha et al. (2000)). The introduction of social capital in 
growth models is still uncommon, but a good example is Beugelsdijk and Smulders 
(2009), who also test the model against empirical data using the European Values Sur-
vey. Economic agents like to socialize (bonding), which they do by losing consumption, 
since participation in social networks is time-consuming and erodes time available for 
work. Hence, higher levels of social capital may decrease economic growth. However, 
participation in community networks (bridging) reduces the incentive for rent seeking 
and cheating, and so through this channel, a higher level of social capital produces posi-
tive effects on economic growth1.
The positive connection between social capital and human capital accumulation was 
first described in Coleman (1988) and in Teachman et al. (1997) in sociological studies 
of high school dropouts. Grafton et al. (2007) test a theoretical growth model against 
empirical data to explain international country differences in productivity and find a 
positive impact of people’s knowledge connections on productivity. Dinda (2008) uses 
an AK-type growth model to study the role of social capital in the production of human 
capital and in economic growth and compares theoretical results with empirical results 
finding a positive effect of social capital. In an endogenous growth model framework 
Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes (2011) also study the interactions between human and 
social capital and document the decline in social capital reported by Putnam (2000). 
Piazza-Giorgi (2002) gives a comprehensive survey of empirical results on this topic.
Literature on the links amongst social capital, R&D, and economic growth is also very 
recent, scarce, and empirical. For example, Landry et al. (2002), De Clercq and Dakhli 
(2004), Lee et al. (2005), and Doh and Acs (2010) test empirically if there is indeed a 
connection and find positive effects of social capital in R&D and in innovation activi-
ties, although estimates vary widely.
No previous attempt that we know of has brought the positive connection between 
social capital and R&D to an endogenous growth model. Our main contribution to the 
literature is to evaluate for the first time the impact of externalities caused by the pres-
ence of social capital in an endogenous growth model.
1 Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) provide an extensive survey of this literature.
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We also wish to contribute to the discussion on “Too Much of a Good Thing?” i. e., the 
optimality of R&D investments2. Thus, this paper is also inserted in the literature on 
the macroeconomic efficiency of R&D investments within endogenous growth models 
without scale effects, whose first contributions were Jones (1995) and Jones and Wil-
liams (2000). The most common finding reported in the literature tends to indicate that 
underinvestment in R&D occurs in the real world (Romer (1990), Grossman, Helpman 
(1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1998) in endogenous growth models with scale effects, 
and also Jones (1995) and Jones, Williams (2000) in models without scale effects, and 
Jones, Williams (1998) in an empirical article). The exceptions are Stokey (1995) and 
Benassy (1998) who, in models with scale effects, found that for more general prefer-
ences or production, overinvestment in R&D can occur. Most recently, Reis and Se-
queira (2007) and Strulik (2007) showed that overinvestment in R&D is more plausible 
than earlier believed.
We build an increasing varieties model with different production sectors, into which 
we introduce social capital. We argue that in this type of model the presence of social 
capital decreases the scope for underinvestment. Social capital brings utility to indi-
viduals and it is also used in the accumulation of human capital and R&D, and in the 
production of the final good. These features of the model are inspired by the empirical 
results stated above.
Section two presents the model and Sections three and four present, respectively, the 
social planner problem and the decentralized equilibrium. Section 5 compares the shares 
of human capital allocation in the social planner and in the decentralized equilibrium 
and discusses distortions in the decentralized equilibrium. In Section 6 we implement 
a calibration exercise to answer the question of how much social capital influences the 
distortions between the efficient and the decentralized solution. Section 7 concludes.
2. Model
In this model we combine different types of capital: physical, human, social, and tech-
nological. Physical capital is used in the production of the final good. Human capital 
has different uses: it is employed in the production of differentiated goods, in schools, 
where it is the main input to new human capital; it is used in the accumulation of social 
capital, as suggested by earlier literature, and is also used in the innovation process. So-
cial capital is used in the production of the final good, in facilitating the accumulation of 
embodied knowledge (human capital), in facilitating the research networks that increase 
R&D productivity, and in its own accumulation. Technological capital is used as an in-
termediated good, in the production of the final good.
A crucial feature in the model is that there is no market for social capital. Social capital 
is produced because it makes families happier. This follows the notion of bonding in 
Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2009). However, firms (firms in the final good and those in 
the R&D market) benefit from social capital, which follows the notion of bridging in 
2 When applied to the economics of investment in R&D this expression was first used by 
Jones and Williams (2000) as part of the article’s title.
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the same article. As firms benefit from social capital without paying for it, this carries 
out externalities with less social capital in the market than in the efficient solution. The 
distortions caused by social capital act in the opposite direction as gains from speciali-
zation and spillovers in the R&D process.
2.1. Production factors and final goods
2.1.1. Capital accumulation
The accumulation of physical capital (Kp) arises through production that is not con-
sumed, and is subject to depreciation:
 ,P P PK Y C K= − − δ   (1)
where Y denotes production of final goods, C is consumption, and δP represents depre-
ciation.
As in the literature stream that began with Arnold (1998), in this model human capital 
is the “ultimate” source of growth. We follow Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes (2011) in 
considering that human capital KH is produced using human capital allocated to school-
ing as well as the total amount of social capital, KS; according to:
 ,H H S H HK H K K= ξ + γ − δ   (2)
where HH are school hours, ξ > 0 is a parameter that measures productivity inside 
schools, γ ≥ 0 measures the sensitivity of human capital accumulation to the stock of 
social capital, and δH ≥ 0 is the depreciation of human capital. This expression captures 
the idea of Coleman (1988) and Teachman et al. (1997) according to which social capital 
is important to the production of human capital. It also ensures that human and social 
capital are substitutes in the production of human capital.
Individual human capital can be divided into skills in final good production (HY), school 
attendance (HH), networking for social capital accumulation (HS), and conducting R&D 
(HR), in a division similar to that of Lucas (1988), used to differentiate between human 
capital allocated to the final good and to schooling, and also used in Dinda (2008). As-
suming that the different human capital activities are not cumulative, we have:
 .H Y H S RK H H H H= + + +   (3)
We based the choice of the functional form for the dynamic evolution of the stock of so-
cial capital on the literature that suggests a strong link between human capital and social 
capital. Also, some empirical literature on social capital has already reported an eco-
nomic payoff from it (e.g., Knack, Keefer (1997) and Temple, Johnson (1998)). Hence, 
social capital accumulation requires that human capital be allocated to its production, 
but at each point in time it will also depend on the current stock of social capital, i.e.,:
 ,S S SK H K= ω +Ω  (4)
where ω measures the productivity of human capital in the production of social capital 
and  0 <>Ω  measures the dynamic effect of social capital on its own production. If Ω > 0, 
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existing social networks are strong enough to keep growing without additional human 
capital. Some types of social capital (such as cultural norms or values) are given by the 
family, which mean that people do not have to make efforts to acquire them. An alterna-
tive way of thinking about a positive Ω is that people with stronger social networks find 
it easier to continue improving networks than people with weaker. If Ω < 0; on the other 
hand, there is a net depreciation effect3.
2.1.2. R&D technology
Technological capital, or new varieties of it, KR, is produced in an R&D sector with hu-
man capital employed in R&D labs (HR), by the stock of disembodied knowledge (KR), 
and is also influenced by the stock of social capital:
 ,R R R SK H K K
φ χυ= ε  (5)
where ε > 0 measures the productivity in the production of technological capital, υ mea-
sures duplication effects, 0 < φ < 1 measures the degree of spillover externalities on 
R&D across time, as in Jones (1995), and 0 < χ < 1 measures the positive effect of social 
networks in R&D productivity4. The parameter χ measures an externality from social 
capital to R&D, representing the ideas and results found in the empirical work of Landry 
et al. (2002), De Clercq and Dakhli (2004), Lee et al. (2005), and Doh and Acs (2010). 
Since agents, when deciding how much to invest in social capital, do not take into ac-
count the effect this has on the R&D firms, they invest less in social capital than what 
would be socially optimal. This externality acts in the same direction as the duplication 
effects (the parameter υ in the equation) and in the opposite direction of spillovers (pa-
rameter φ in the equation), since it acts in favour of overinvestment in R&D.
2.1.3. Final good production
The final good is a differentiated one, produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology5:
 1 ,    and   1,   0.Y RSY D K H K
−β−σ ηβ σ= β σ < η >   (6)



















3 We choose to model social capital based on the still scarce literature about it, i.e., we do not consider 
higher bounds for the stock of social capital. This is the same assumption we make for human capital, 
following the recent literature on human capital. There is no reason to consider that human capital 
grows without bounds, at a constant long-run rate, and to consider the opposite for social capital. 
This functional form is also used in Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes (2011).
4 Theoretically, one could generally assume that χ might have negative values and values greater 
than unity. However, for simplification we assume that it varies between 0 (no effect of researchers’ 
networks) and 1 (proportional effect of researchers’ networks). In fact, in the calibration exercise we 
reasonably assume that the effect of researchers’ networks is less than the effect of past technological 
knowledge (χ < φ). If χ = 0, we would obtain the formulation for R&D technology used in Jones 
(1995).
5 Using σ > 1 instead does not change our main results.
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The elasticity of substitution between varieties is measured by 0 < α < 1. xi is the inter-




This means that (6) can be re-written as:
 1 .R P YSY K K K H
η β −β−σσ=  (8)
In what follows we will see that σ measures an externality from the households’ to the 
firms’ choice of social capital. Although households choose social capital comparing its 
marginal utility with its opportunity cost in terms of human capital, firms do not choose 
social capital. Instead, they face social capital as a “gift” embodied in workers. This leads 
to another externality, which implies less social capital in the decentralized equilibrium 
than in the optimum and also tends to increase the scope for overinvestment in R&D.
2.2. Consumers
We assume that households benefit directly from socializing. This follows the concept 
of bonding (as, for example, in Beugelsdijk, Smulders 2009). A similar utility function, 
with a positive effect of social capital on utility, can also be found in Roseta-Palma et al. 
(2010): 






t S t StU C K C K e dt
τ−∞
ψ −ρττ=
τ − ∫  
(9)
where Ψ represents the preference for social capital and ρ is the utility discount rate7.
3. Optimal growth
In this section we derive the conditions associated with the maximization of (9) subject 
to the production function (6) as well as the transition equations for the different types of 
capital (1), (2), (4), and (5)8.
The problem gives rise to the following Hamiltonian function:
                 ( ) ( )
1
1
1 P P PR P YS S
CK K K K H C K
τ−
ψ η β −β−σσττ= + λ − − δ +
τ −

  ( ) ( ) ( ),H H S H H S S S R R R SH K K H K H K K
φ χυλ ξ + γ − δ + λ ω +Ω + λ ε  (10)
where the λj are the co-state variables for each stock Kj; with j = P, H, S, R. Considering 
choice variables C, HY, HS, and HR (and substituting HH for KH – HY – HS – HR using (3)), 
the first-order conditions yield:
6 We modeled taste for variety in this specific manner in order to isolate the gains of specialization 
(η) from the mark-up (1/ α) and from the share of physical capital in the final good production (β). 
This specification follows Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2005) and allows us to separate important 
externalities in comparison to what happens in the standard specification.
7 The t subscripts are dropped hereinafter for ease of notation.
8 In this section we are dealing with aggregated variables.
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representing the marginal utilities of 
consumption and social capital, respectively.
3.1. Optimal growth rates
By definition growth rates will be constant in the steady state, so equation (1) tells us that 
Kp, Y, and C all grow at the same rate. Furthermore, KS and KH components will also be 
growing at that same rate, respecting equations (2) to (4)9.
Denote the growth rate of technological capital as 
RKg  and the growth rate of human 
capital as 
HKg : From equation (5) we can see that these two growth rates must respect 
this relationship: 
( )1




. In the steady state, we can obtain the human capital 
growth rate as follows. From (12) we find  
H P HY Kg g g gλ λ= + −  and using equation 





g g λ − + ψ − = τ τ λ 

, 







ξ − δ − ρ
=
  χ + υ
η  − φ    + ψ − +  − β τ τ  
 
(19)
9 In this work we did not analyse the transitional dynamics of the model. We analyse the 
unique inner steady-state solution of the model.
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Using the fact that 
( )1




, we solve for the growth rate of technological 
capital:









ξ − δ − ρ
− φ
=
  υ +
η  − φ    + ψ − +  − β τ τ    
(20)
From (8) and 
( )1









  χ + υ
η  − φ  = + −β 
. By substituting 












  χ + υ
η  − φ  ξ − δ − ρ + −β =
  χ + υ
η  − φ    + ψ − +  − β τ τ    
(21)
While the impact of the social capital share (σ) is positive in growth rates, the impact of 
preference for social capital (ψ) is negative, as it has a trade-off with consumption. This 
has a parallel with the effects of bonding and bridging in growth rates in the article from 
Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2009). Optimal growth rates depend on parameters of the 
model as usual in non-scale models of endogenous growth.
4. Decentralized equilibrium
In the decentralized equilibrium both consumers and firms make choices that maximize, 
respectively, their own felicity or profits10. Consumers maximize their intertemporal 
utility function (9) subject to the budget constraint:
  ( ) ( ) ,P H H H S Ra r a W K H H H C= − δ + − − − −  (22)
where a represents the family physical assets, r is the gross return on physical capital, 
and WH is the market wage. The market price for the consumption good is normalized 
to 1. Since it is making an intertemporal choice, the family also takes into account equa-
tions (2) and (4), which represent human and social capital accumulation, respectively11.
The markets for purchased production factors are assumed to be competitive. However, 
we assume that the firm cannot buy social capital, as there is, in effect, no market for 
10 In this section we are working with individual variables.
11 FOC and growth rates for the decentralized equilibrium are available upon request. They are derived 
in the same way than the ones for the social planner problem.
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it. Social capital is treated here as exogenous, although it affects the firm’s production. 
Hence, consumer decisions will carry social capital externalities.
















where pD represents the price for the index of intermediate capital goods.
Each firm in the intermediate goods sector owns an infinitely-lived patent for selling 
its variety xi. Producers of differentiated goods act under monopolistic competition 
in which they sell their own variety of the intermediate capital good xi and maximize 
operating profits, πi:  ( ) ,i i ip r xπ = −  (25)
where pi denotes the price of intermediate good i and r is the gross unit cost of xi. The 
demand for each intermediate good results from the maximization of profits in the final 
goods sector. Profit maximization in this sector implies that each firm charges a price of:
  pi = p = r/a.  (26) 
With identical technologies and symmetric demand, the quantity supplied is the same for 
all goods, xi = x. Hence, equation (7) can be written as:
 D = KRx.  (27)
From D Rp D pxK= , together with (24) and (26), we obtain:







After insertion of equations (26) and (28) into (25), profits can be rewritten as:
  ( )1 / .RY Kπ = − α β  (29)
Let υ denote the value of an innovation, defined by:
 








R r dτ = τ τ∫
 
(30)
Taking into account the cost of an innovation as determined by equation (5), free-entry in
R&D implies that,
 R R R SH H K K
φ χυω = νε  if ( )0 0 ;R RK H> > , (31)
 R R R SH H K K
φ χυω > νε  if ( )0 0 .R RK H= =  (32)
Finally, the no-arbitrage condition requires that investing in patents has the same return 
as investing in bonds:
 ( ) / .Pr
ν
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5. Optimality of human capital allocations
Using the FOC obtained from the social planner solution (11) to (18) and the equations 
that describe the evolution of the four capital stocks (1), (2), (4), and (5), it is possible to 
obtain the shares of human capital allocated to the different sectors in the economy (final 
good, human capital, social capital, and R&D). The shares of human capital allocated to 
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(38)
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   ω   ηνψ + σ    −β − σ −β −σ     φ = + ην   − φωχ  ξ − δ + − + χ  −β − σ  χ + νν    +  
ω     − φψ + σ ξ − δ + − + χ    −β − σ   χ + ν     
                                                                                                                
(39)
Using the FOC obtained for the decentralized equilibrium solution, the equations that 
describe the evolution of the four capital stocks (1), (2), (4), and (5), and also equations 
(23), (29), (31) and (33), it is possible to obtain the shares of human capital allocated 
to the different sectors in the economy: final good, human capital, social capital, and 
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ξ − δ + χ + − + φ  χ + ν    
(43)
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 β − α ωγ  ξ − δ − −Ω  −β − σξ   φ = +     − φω    ξ − δ + − + χ + φψ       χ + ν−β − σ           
(45)
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As growth rates and the consumption to output ratio are equal in the social planner and 
decentralized equilibrium solutions, the differences from the two solutions are spillovers 
in R&D, duplication effect in R&D, the specialization gains, and the externalities from 
social capital. As in Alvarez-Palaez and Groth (2005), the social gains from specializa-
tion (η) compare with the private gain from an innovation β(1 – α)12. From the compari-
son of (34)–(37) to (40)–(43) taking into account the comparison between (45) and (39), 
it is possible to advance the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The Decentralized Equilibrium yields a sub-optimal or over-optimal so-
cial capital to human capital ratio and R&D effort, depending on the opposite effects of 
the following externalities:
(i) the social capital externalities (σ and χ ), which increase the social to human 
capital ratio in the social planner solution, increase the human capital allocated 
to social capital production, and decrease human capital allocated to “schools”, 
final good, and R&D sectors;
(ii) the spillover externality (φ), which decreases human capital allocated to R&D in 
the market, increases the social to human capital ratio, and then increases alloca-
tions to the final good and to social capital production, but decreases the allocation 
to the education sector in the market;
(iii) the duplication externality (υ), which decreases human capital allocated to R&D 
in the planner’s solution, increases the social to human capital ratio, and then 
increases allocations to the final good and to the social capital production, but 
decreases allocation to the education sector in the planner’s solution;
(iv) the difference between the social gain from specialization and the private gain from 
specialization ( ( 1η ≠ β − α )) , which decreases social to human capital ratio in the 
social planner’s solution, decreases human capital allocated to the final good and 
to the social capital production, and increases allocation to all the other sectors 
in the economy.
Thus, relatively high social capital shares in the final good production and R&D technol-
ogy may contribute to decrease the underinvestment in R&D. Spillovers and social gains 
from specialization act in favour of underinvestment and duplication, and social capital 
externalities act in favour of overinvestment.
As is usual in studies seeking to evaluate distortions between the social planner and 
decentralized equilibrium solutions, this evaluation is a quantitative issue. Thus, we now 
implement a calibration exercise to evaluate the distortions.
6. Results and calibration
6.1. Calibration procedure
It is not easy to take a model with social capital to data, as research dealing with social 
capital is still scarce. Some parameters in our model are quite standard in the litera-
ture: the intertemporal substitution parameter (τ = 0.5), the intertemporal discount factor 
(ρ = 0.02), the share of physical capital in income (β = 0.36), the markup (1/α = 1.33), 
12 This proof is available upon request.
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and the productivity of R&D (ε = 0.1), and we therefore do not discuss them13. For oth-
ers, there is a range of plausible values: the depreciation rates (δK, δH), the productivity 
of human capital accumulation (ξ), the contribution of social capital to economic growth 
(σ), spillovers (φ), and duplication effects (υ). For these values we discuss our options. 
For other parameters there is greater uncertainty. For γ and ω, we conclude that changes 
in them are not crucial for the distortion evaluation. We therefore fix their values at 0.01. 
For the preference for social capital (ψ) we test different values and conclude that values 
greater than 0 and less than 1 (i.e., consumers prefer consumption to social capital, which 
seems reasonable) do not change conclusions on distortions. Thus, we choose an inter-
mediate value of ψ = 0.5. For the spillover and duplication effects we choose φ = 0.4 and 
υ = 0.5 as reasonable values suggested in the literature14. For the externality of social 
capital in the R&D technology we choose one half of the spillover value, reasonably as-
suming that the effect of research networks on R&D is much lower than the “standing 
on shoulders” effect.
For the depreciation of physical capital, we set the realistic and commonly used value 
δK = 0.05. In earlier research that considers human and physical capital accumulation 
simultaneously, a zero depreciation is considered. For the human capital depreciation, 
Heckman (1976) reports that it lies between 0.7%  and 4.7%. We consider either δH = 0, 
as in most earlier models with human capital accumulation or an intermediate value 
between 0.007 and 0.047, δH = 0.02. However, this value does not influence our main 
results. For the parameter Ω, which can measure a positive effect of social capital in its 
accumulation or a depreciation of social capital, we use alternatively –0.01 and 0.01. 
For each of these exercises, we set the steady-state economic growth rate to 1.85%, 
which gives us a value for ξ. This procedure yields values in the range used in the hu-
man capital literature (e.g., Funke, Strulik 2000). For the impact of social capital on 
economic growth, we use a lower bound estimate for σ of 0.08, as in Knack and Keefer 
(1997), where in a 10% increase in trust implies a 0.8% increase in the economic growth 
rate. We also use a high bound for σ = 1 – β – σ = 0.32, suggested by the evidence in 
Whiteley (2000), which points to an effect of social capital as great as the effect of hu-
man capital. Whiteley’s findings also approximate the evidence in World Bank (2006), 
reporting a share of 0.78 to intangible capital, which includes both human and social 
capital. For the consumption-output ratio (C/Y) we found a reasonable value around 0.8.
Table 1 below summarizes the calibration values, in which we use two sets. The first, 
which we call “benchmark”, shows the distortion caused by social capital in the absence 
of any other distortion (in this calibration there are no spillovers, duplication effects, or 
specialization gains). In the second (designated “Reasonable”), we set spillovers to 0.4 
(see Reis, Sequeira 2007), duplication to 0.5 (see Pessoa 2005), specialization gains to 
0.196 (see Jones and Williams 2000), and the social capital share to a value between 
0.08 and 0.32 (see above).
13 For the markup value we use a median value from Norrbin (1993).
14 See Reis and Sequeira (2007) for a discussion about the value of φ in models with human capital 
accumulation and Pessoa (2005) for estimations of φ and υ.
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Table 1. Calibration values
Basic Parameters Parameters for Externalities
Parameter Benchmark/Reasonable Parameter Benchmark Reasonable
τ 0.5 χ varies 0.2
β 0.36 σ varies 0.08 or 0.32
ρ 0.02 φ 0 0.4
α 0.75 υ 1 0.5
δH 0 / 0.02 η  β(1 – α) 0.196
δK 0.05 Calibrated Variables
γ, ω 0.01 ξ depends on gY; [0.05; 0.1]
Ω –0.01 / 0.01 gY 0.0185
6.2. Distortions from social capital
We now present the differences between the decentralized equilibrium and the optimal 
solution when there are distortions from only social capital. Thus, we apply benchmark 
calibration values. Figure 1 shows the different values of the KS / KH ratio through dif-
ferent values for the share of social capital in production. Figure 2 shows the change of 
the allocation of human capital to the social capital sector. Figure 3 shows the change in 
the allocation of human capital to the R&D sector through different values of the same 
share. We also present three figures showing the change in the ratio KS / KH, the share uS, 
and the share uR through different values for the externality of social capital in the R&D 
technology.
From Figures 1 to 3 we can note that increasing the value of the share of social capital 
in the final good production increases the distortions in the decentralized economy, 
increasing the differences between the socially desired ratio of social to human capi-
tal and the ratio obtained by the decentralized action of different agents (Figure 1). 
Fig. 1. Comparison between (KS / KH)DE and (KS / KH)* for different values  
of the share of social capital in production
0
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This distortion clearly causes underallocation of human capital to the social capital 
sector (Figure 2) and overinvestment in R&D, as can be seen from Figure 3. While the 
ratio KS / KH by nearly four times until σ = 0.43 in the optimal solution, it rises by only 
half that in the decentralized economy. The difference between the efficient allocation 
to the R&D sector and the market allocation can rise up to 1.3%, while the difference 
between efficient allocation to social capital and the market allocation can go up to 14%.
From Figures 4 to 6 we can see that increasing the effect of social capital on R&D 
technology also increases distortions, but less so than the rise in distortions caused by 
the final good social capital share. In this case a change from χ = 0 to χ = 1 implies 
distortion in KS / KH of 0.004, a distortion in uS of about 1%, and finally a distortion in 
uR of near 0.05%. We also have a tendency for underinvestment in social capital and 
overinvestment to R&D.
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Fig. 2. Comparison between DESu  and *Su  for different values of the share  
of social capital in production
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Fig. 3. Comparison between DERu  and *Ru  for different values  
of the share of social capital in production
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Fig. 4. Comparison between (KS / KH)DE and (KS / KH)* for different values  
of the share of social capital in R&D
Fig. 5. Comparison between DESu  and *Su  for different values of the share  
of social capital in R&D
Fig. 6. Comparison between DERu  and *Ru  for different values of the share  
of social capital in R&D
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6.3. Taking all distortions together
In this section we present results from quantitative exercises in which we apply the 
calibration values depicted as “Reasonable” in Table 1. Tables 2 to 4 compare the social 
planner allocations to the decentralized equilibrium ones. We show three different ex-
ercises: the first eliminates the distortions due to social capital and sets other distortions 
at reasonable levels, given by parameter values discussed above; the second considers a 
lower limit for the social capital share in production and a reasonable value for the ex-
ternality of social capital in the R&D technology, and keeps values for other parameters 
at the level used in the first exercise; the third exercise is equal to the second, except for 
the share of social capital in production, which increases to 0.32. The only difference 
in Table 3 (from Table 2) is that it uses a depreciation for human capital of δH = 0.02. 
The only difference in Table 4 (also from Table 2) is to consider a depreciation of social 
capital (Ω = –0.01). In all these exercises gKH oscillates from 1.36% to 1.47% and gKR 
from 1.23% to 1.59%.
Without the distortions introduced in this article (σ = 0, χ = 0), we note that the ten-
dency for underinvestment in R&D is high, as predicted in earlier literature (e.g., Jones, 
Williams 2000). Human capital allocation in the decentralized economy is almost at the 
optimal level and there are over-allocations to the final good production and to the social 
capital sector. It is worth noting that due to the distortions from social gains from spe-
cialization, spillovers, and duplication, there is a relatively higher ratio of social capital 
to human capital in the market economy when compared to the social planner choice.
When we consider positive values for σ and χ we note that the social to human capital 
ratio is now higher in the efficient solution than in the market economy, which is due to 
the distortions introduced in this article. The absence of a market for social capital is re-
sponsible for having relatively lower social capital in the market than in the case in which 
social welfare would be taken into account. This is reflected in the allocation of human 
capital to social capital production, which should also be higher than it is in the market 
economy. As a result, allocation of human capital to the human capital accumulation 
sector is above the optimal level and the level of underinvestment in R&D is reduced.
In the third exercise, the distortion in the social capital sector is so high that the social 
planner would allocate to that sector nearly twice the human capital allocated by the 
market economy (from 6.63% to 11.48% in Table 2; from 4.86% to 8.35% in Table 3, 
and from 16.98% to 24.92% in Table 4). Thus, in these scenarios the social planner 
would reallocate human capital from final good production and schools to social capital 
accumulation sectors and to R&D. This means that some policies can be designed to 
enhance the production of social capital.
Considering a positive depreciation for human capital, as we do in Table 3, introduces 
almost no differences in distortions from the social planner allocations. However, such 
a high depreciation in human capital predicts a share of human capital allocated to the 
human capital accumulation sector that is at the highest limit of the reasonable interval 
for that variable. Nevertheless, when we introduce a depreciation in social capital ac-
cumulation, as in Table 4, we note some important differences. The share of human 
capital allocated to the social capital production sector is greater than in previous ex-
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Table 2. Results from reasonable calibrations (δH = 0, Ω = 0.01)
σ σ = 0 σ = 0.08 σ = 0.32
χ χ = 0 χ = 0.2 χ = 0.2
SP DE SP/DE SP DE SP/DE SP DE SP/DE
KS / KH 0.090 0.090 0.99 0.132 0.110 1.21 0.316 0.183 1.73
uY 70.41% 70.78% 0.99 70.73% 71.76% 0.99 64.99% 68.35% 0.95
uS 4.38% 4.30% 0.99 4.81% 3.98% 1.21 11.48% 6.63% 1.73
uH 22.83% 22.82% 1.00 20.88% 21.26% 0.98 17.76% 20.02% 0.89
uR 2.49% 2.10% 1.18 3.59% 3.00% 1.20 5.77% 4.99% 1.16
Table 3. Results from reasonable calibrations (δH = 0.02, Ω = 0.01)
σ σ = 0 σ = 0.08 σ = 0.32
χ χ = 0 χ = 0.2 χ = 0.2
SP DE SP/DE SP DE SP/DE SP DE SP/DE
KS / KH 0.067 0.067 0.99 0.097 0.081 1.21 0.230 0.134 1.72
uY 52.97% 52.97% 0.99 52.44% 53.27% 0.98 47.73% 50.54% 0.94
uS 3.17% 3.19% 0.99 3.53% 2.93% 1.21 8.35% 4.86% 1.72
uH 42.26% 42.26% 1.00 41.37% 41.58% 0.99 39.69% 40.90% 0.97
uR 1.86% 1.57% 1.18 2.66% 2.22% 1.20 4.24% 3.69% 1.15
Table 4. Results from reasonable calibrations (δH = 0.02, Ω = –0.01)
σ σ = 0 σ = 0.08 σ = 0.32
χ χ = 0 χ = 0.2 χ = 0.2
SP DE SP/DE SP DE SP/DE SP DE SP/DE
KS / KH 0.041 0.041 0.99 0.056 0.048 1.17 0.105 0.072 1.47
uY 45.60% 45.80% 0.99 42.74% 44.84% 0.95 31.06% 38.51% 0.82
uS 10.21% 10.25% 0.99 13.20% 11.30% 1.17 24.92% 16.98% 1.47
uH 42.58% 42.58% 1.00 41.89% 41.99% 1.00 41.26% 41.69% 0.99
uR 1.61% 1.36% 1.18 2.17% 1.87% 1.16 2.76% 2.81% 0.98
ercises because human capital allocated to that sector must compensate the deprecia-
tion effect, while in previous exercises this did not occur because social capital could 
grow by itself (exogenously). The most important implication is that underinvestment in 
R&D is much reduced (from * /  1 .16R Ru u =  to * /   0.98R Ru u = ), opening the possibility 
to overinvestment in R&D.
This means that the threshold level for the share of social capital in production (σ) 
above which there is overinvestment in R&D is below 0.32, which is in the range of 
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plausible values according to World Bank (2006). The higher the depreciation for social 
capital, the lower the threshold value for its share in production above which overinvest-
ment in R&D occurs. In fact, in the case of the third exercise in Table 2, we can see 
that considering a 1% depreciation for social capital, we can obtain overinvestment to 
R&D while maintaining lower and perhaps more reasonable values for the allocations 
through sectors in the economy, with the highest allocation to the final good production.
7. Conclusion
The interaction between social capital and R&D has been pointed out as an element of 
research networks. We build the production side of the model taking into account the 
interactions between the different types of capital that have been discussed in earlier 
(mainly) empirical literature. In particular, we note the importance of the use of human 
capital in social capital accumulation and the importance of this last factor in the produc-
tion of the final good, and also in the discovery of new ideas, i.e., in the R&D sector.
In the model we also consider the most important distortions present in previous mod-
els: the social benefit from specialization, spillovers, and duplication in R&D. We im-
plement a calibration exercise in order to evaluate the strength of the new distortions 
from social capital. First we show that new distortions lead to underinvestment in social 
capital, when we examine the social to human capital ratio and when we compare al-
locations of human capital to the social capital accumulation sector. Second, we also 
show that the presence of these distortions decreases the tendency to underinvestment 
in R&D. However, quantitatively these distortions are not strong enough to cause over-
investment in R&D when social capital has a positive effect on its own accumulation. 
The opposite result is obtained when social capital depreciates. In fact, in this case, the 
social capital externalities introduced in this article are able to generate overinvestment 
in R&D. This complements the recent literature (Strulik 2007; Reis, Sequeira 2007) that 
present more arguments in favour of overinvestment. Moreover, our results point out 
a share of human capital in social capital accumulation that oscillates in the decentral-
ized equilibrium from 3% to near 17%, which is an additional quantitative reason to 
integrate social capital in an endogenous growth model with R&D and human capital 
accumulation, as we do in this article.
We devise an endogenous growth model with social capital that contributes to produc-
tion and utility simultaneously, and evaluate both analytically and quantitatively the 
distortions that are present in its market equilibrium. This shows the importance of 
considering social capital in the endogenous growth theory.
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